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MICHIGAN V. EPA: MONEY MATTERS WHEN DECIDING
WHETHER TO REGULATE POWER PLANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies play an essential role as one of the
Federal government’s core regulatory instruments.1 Congress delegates its regulatory authority to administrative agencies with varying
degrees of purpose and power.2 Because of their broad authority to
“exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers[,]” administrative agency decisions are often challenged by entities subject to
their regulations.3 Despite challenges from such entities, however,
the Supreme Court of the United States has traditionally granted
deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous
statutory language.4
This Note addresses one such challenge.5 In Michigan v. EPA,6
state and industrial entities challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA or Agency) refusal to consider cost in determining whether to regulate power plants.7 Through the Clean Air Act
(CAA), “Congress directed the Agency to perform a study of the
hazards” that power plant emissions posed to public health.8 Based
1. See Michael Uhlmann, A Note on Administrative Agencies, THE HERITAGE
GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION, http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/2/
essays/101/a-note-on-administrative-agencies (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (discussing general history of administrative agencies).
2. See id. (discussing administrative agencies’ function).
3. See id. (discussing challenges to regulatory authority). See generally Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984) (challenging EPA’s regulation to treat all pollution-emitting devices similarly); Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705-06 (2015) (challenging EPA’s “appropriate and necessary” regulation of power plants); City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
133 S. Ct. 1863, 1863 (2013) (challenging FCC ruling under Telecommunications
Act).
4. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (establishing principle of judicial deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations and constructions of statutes);
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (reviewing EPA’s “necessary and appropriate” regulation of power plants under Chevron’s deference standard); Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at
1868 (applying Chevron deference standard in reviewing FCC ruling under Telecommunications Act).
5. For a discussion of the general topic of this Note, see infra notes 6-18 and
accompanying text.
6. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
7. Id. at 2706 (stating Petitioners’ central challenge to EPA’s decision to regulate power plants).
8. See id. at 2705 (internal quotations omitted) (discussing CAA guidelines of
EPA study).

(275)
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on that study, the EPA found that the regulation of power plants
was both “appropriate and necessary.”9 In June 2015, the Supreme
Court of the United States overturned the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, thereby, striking down the regulation.10 In striking down the regulation, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the EPA’s statutory interpretation of the
CAA “to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power plants” was unreasonable.11 The Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that the EPA “must consider cost . . . before
deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary.”12
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court of the United States’
decision in Michigan.13 Part II of this Note provides the factual basis
of the dispute and describes the circumstances that led to the dispute.14 Part III provides the statutory framework of the Clean Air
Act and provides a brief overview of relevant case law.15 Part IV
presents the Supreme Court of the United States’ analysis in reaching its conclusion that the EPA unreasonably interpreted the Clean
Air Act to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power plants.16 Part V analyzes the Supreme Court of the
United States’ decision to invalidate as unreasonable the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA’s “appropriate and necessary” clause.17 Finally, Part VI, discusses the possible impact of the Supreme Court
of the United States’ ruling on future EPA decisions to regulate
industries and entities.18

9. See id. at 2705-06 (establishing findings of EPA study).
10. See id. at 2711-12 (stating Supreme Court holding).
11. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711-12 (holding EPA’s finding of “appropriate
and necessary” regulation unreasonable).
12. See id. at 2711 (explaining rationale of holding).
13. See generally id. at 2699 (determining EPA’s statutory interpretation to be
unreasonable).
14. For a further discussion of the factual background of Michigan, see infra
notes 19-44 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the legal background of Michigan, see infra
notes 45-82 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the narrative analysis of the Supreme Court of
the United States’ decision in Michigan, see infra notes 83-149 and accompanying
text.
17. For a further discussion of the critical analysis of the Supreme Court of
the United States’ decision in Michigan, see infra notes 150-197 and accompanying
text.
18. For a further discussion of the impact of the Supreme Court of the United
States’ decision in Michigan, see infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS
In Michigan, state and industry entities challenged the EPA’s
refusal to consider cost in determining whether to regulate power
plants.19 The CAA grants the EPA authority to regulate power
plants.20 Specifically, the CAA “establishes a series of regulatory
programs to control air pollution from stationary sources (such as
refineries and factories) and moving sources (such as cars and airplanes).”21 One such regulatory program, the National Emissions
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Program, is at issue in this
litigation.22
The Hazardous Air Pollutants Program (Program) regulates
stationary sources based on their emissions categorization as either
a “major source” or an “area source.”23 Specifically, the Program
defines a “major source” as any stationary “source that emits more
than 10 tons of a single pollutant or more than 25 tons of a combination of pollutants per year.”24 The Program defines an “area
source” as any stationary source whose emissions levels do not surpass the emissions levels of a major source.25 The “EPA is required
to regulate all major sources under the program.”26 The EPA, however, is “required to regulate an area source under the program
[only] if it presents a threat of adverse effects to human health or
the environment . . . warranting regulation.”27
Under the CAA Amendments of 1990, Congress established
separate regulatory requirements for “fossil-fuel-fired power
plants.”28 In order to determine whether to regulate power plants,
19. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (stating Petitioners’ central
challenge to EPA’s decision to regulate power plants). Petitioners included
twenty-three states and various industrial and environmental entities. Id.
20. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2012) (noting source of EPA’s
regulatory power over power plants).
21. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2704 (discussing regulatory purpose of CAA).
22. Id. (discussing hazardous-air-pollutants program). This program was established by the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. Id.
23. See id. at 2704-05 (explaining Program’s method for regulating stationary
sources); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (defining regulation of stationary
sources).
24. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1)) (defining
“major source” categorization).
25. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(2)) (defining “area source”
categorization).
26. See id. (discussing EPA regulatory requirements under CAA).
27. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1)(3)) (describing EPA required regulation of “area source” under CAA).
28. See id. (explaining regulatory program applicable to oil and coal fired
power plants). The CAA classifies fossil-fuel-fired power plants as “electric utility
steam generating units, but [the Court and this Note] will simply call them power
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“Congress directed the [EPA] to perform a study of the hazards to
public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by [power plants] of [hazardous air pollutants] after imposition of the requirements . . . .”29 Section 7412(n)(1) of the CAA
required the EPA to regulate power plants if it found that “regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of
the study . . . .”30
In 1998, the EPA completed the study mandated by Section
7412(n)(1) of the CAA and ultimately concluded that the regulation of fossil-fuel-fired power plants was both “appropriate and necessary.”31 The Agency found regulation “appropriate because (1)
power plants’ emissions of mercury and other hazardous air pollutants posed risks to human health and the environment and (2)
controls were available to reduce these emissions.”32 The Agency
found regulation “necessary because the imposition of the Act’s
other requirements did not eliminate these risks.”33 Most importantly, the EPA “concluded that costs should not be considered
when deciding whether power plants should be regulated” under
Section 7412 of the CAA.34

plants.” Id. The parties agreed that the intended effect of these regulatory requirements was to “reduc[e] power plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants,
although the extent of the reduction was unclear.” Id.
29. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing whether and how to regulate power plants); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(n)(1)(A) (emphasizing purpose of EPA’s mandated study).
30. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)) (requiring regulation where EPA deems “appropriate and necessary”). The Court
assumed as correct the EPA’s interpretation of this statutory language to mean that
power plants should be made subject to regulation on the same terms as other
major and area sources of hazardous air pollutants. See id. The regulatory process
for major and area sources generally requires the EPA to: (1) “divide sources covered by the program into categories and subcategories[;]” (2) “promulgate certain
minimum emission regulations, known as floor standards . . . to reflect the emissions limitations already achieved by the best-performing 12% of sources within
the category or subcategory[;]” and (3) “impose [where necessary] more stringent
emission regulations, known as beyond-the-floor standards.” Id. The EPA must
consider cost under the third stage of the regulatory process. Id.
31. See id. (discussing findings of EPA study).
32. See id. (citing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,
77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9363 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63))
(explaining why EPA found regulation of power plants “appropriate”).
33. See id. (citing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,
77 Fed. Reg. at 9363) (explaining why EPA found regulation of power plants
“necessary”).
34. See id. (quoting National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9363) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing EPA’s
post-study findings).
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On May 3, 2011, the EPA issued a final rule, promulgating its
regulation of power plants.35 Alongside the regulation, the EPA
provided a “Regulatory Impact Analysis” (Analysis).36 The Analysis
estimated that the EPA’s regulation, if enacted, would impose an
annual compliance cost equivalent to nearly $9.6 billion on power
plants.37 Additionally, the Analysis projected that the regulation’s
“benefits of reducing power plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants[,]” although not fully quantifiable, range from four to six
million dollars annually.38 The Agency provided, however, that if
the regulation’s “ancillary effects” are taken into account, the
“quantifiable benefits” of its regulation could reach thirty-seven to
ninety billion dollars annually.39 The Agency nevertheless claimed
that its “appropriate-and-necessary finding did not rest on these ancillary effects . . . .”40
Petitioners filed a lawsuit, which challenged the EPA’s “refusal
to consider cost” when it determined that the regulation of power
plants was “appropriate and necessary.”41 Subsequently, the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA’s decision not to
consider cost in making its determination to regulate power
plants.42 The Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
holding that the EPA interpreted Section 7412 of the CAA “unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the [initial] decision to
regulate power plants.”43 The Court ultimately held that the EPA
“must consider cost-including, most importantly, [the] cost of com35. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 9363 (containing full version of EPA’s final rule).
36. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705 (discussing EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis). In its briefs, the “EPA conced[ed] that the Regulatory Impact Analysis
‘played no role’ in its appropriate-and-necessary finding.” Id. at 2706 (quoting
EPA’s Br. 14).
37. See id. at 2705-06 (discussing estimated cost of compliance with EPA regulation to power plants).
38. See id. at 2706 (discussing estimated benefits of regulation to environment). The Court points out that, in comparison, “the costs to power plants were
thus between 1,600 and 2,400 times as great as the quantifiable benefits of reduced
emissions of hazardous air pollutants.” Id.
39. See id. (discussing Regulatory Impact Analysis’s estimations of regulation’s
costs and benefits). The Agency cited “cutting power plants’ emissions of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide” as “ancillary effects” of the regulation. Id.
40. See id. (highlighting EPA’s claim that ancillary benefits “‘played no role’
in its appropriate-and-necessary finding”).
41. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (stating basis of Petitioner’s claim).
42. See id. (stating holding of Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit that upheld
EPA’s decision not to consider cost).
43. See id. at 2711-12 (announcing holding of Supreme Court of United
States).
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pliance-before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and
necessary.”44
II. BACKGROUND
The CAA embodies the primary federal law providing for the
regulation of air emissions.45 The CAA is primarily administered by
the EPA and, like any federal statute enforced by an administrative
agency, the EPA is accorded broad deference in interpreting and
implementing the CAA.46 The extent of deference granted to administrative agencies is not without constraint however.47
A. The Clean Air Act
In 1970, Congress enacted the CAA in an effort to prevent and
control air pollution.48 The primary purpose of the CAA is “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare . . . .”49 The CAA seeks to
accomplish its mission by encouraging “reasonable Federal, State
and local governmental actions . . . for [air] pollution prevention.”50 The CAA establishes regulatory programs aimed at controlling air pollution from both “stationary sources” and “moving
sources.”51 In 1990, Congress enacted amendments to the CAA “to
provide for [the] attainment and maintenance of health protective
national ambient air quality standards.”52
B. Deference Accorded to Administrative Agencies
Congress grants administrative agencies broad deference in
their interpretation of statutes and construction of statutory
44. See id. at 2711 (holding EPA must consider cost in making its “appropriate
and necessary” determination to regulate power plants).
45. For a discussion of the CAA, see infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
46. For a discussion of the broad deference accorded to administrative agencies, see infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
47. For a discussion of the limitations imposed on the deference accorded to
administrative agencies, see infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
48. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1990) (stating Congressional findings
and declaration of purpose of CAA).
49. See § 7401(b) (declaring purpose of CAA).
50. See § 7401(c) (asserting air pollution prevention as main objective of
CAA).
51. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2704 (explaining CAA’s regulatory scheme).
Under the CAA, “stationary sources” include “refineries and factories” while “moving sources” include “cars and airplanes.” Id.
52. Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990)
(providing Congress’s reason for amending CAA).
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schemes.53 Thus, courts evaluate an administrative agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language within a deferential
framework.54 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,55 the Supreme Court of the United States considered
whether an EPA regulation’s construction of the term “stationary
source” constituted a “reasonable construction” of the statutory
term under the CAA.56 The EPA regulation at issue “allow[ed] a
State to adopt a plant wide definition of the term ‘stationary
source’” for purposes of the CAA in an effort to achieve greater
compliance with the EPA’s national air quality standards.57 The
Court held that the EPA’s construction of the term “stationary
source” was a “permissible construction of the statute which seeks
to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic
growth.”58 In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized the importance of upholding the “principle of deference to administrative
interpretations.”59
Chevron established the deferential framework with which
courts evaluate an administrative agency’s interpretation of statutes.60 Specifically, “Chevron directs courts to accept an agency’s
reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that the agency
administers.”61 In Chevron, the Court provided that “[w]hen a court
reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions[:]”
53. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (establishing principle of judicial deference to administrative
agencies’ interpretations and constructions of statutes); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at
2706-07 (reviewing EPA’s “necessary and appropriate” regulation of power plants
under Chevron deference standard); Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)
(applying Chevron deference standard in reviewing FCC ruling under Telecommunications Act).
54. For a further discussion of case law in which courts apply the Chevron deference standard to administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations, see supra
note 53 and accompanying text.
55. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
56. See id. at 840 (explaining central issue of case). The EPA’s regulation applied to States classified as “nonattainment” States that “had not achieved the national air quality standards” established by the [EPA].” Id. at 840.
57. Id. (explaining purpose of EPA’s regulation). The EPA’s regulation effectively “allow[ed] States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same
industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’.” Id. at
837.
58. Id. at 866 (stating Supreme Court’s holding).
59. Id. at 844 (explaining Court’s long-held deference to executive and administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations).
60. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (relying on “principle of deference” to administrative statutory interpretations).
61. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (citing Chevron precedent of deferential
framework).
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First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.62
Under the Chevron deference standard, an ambiguity in a statute implicitly authorizes an administrative agency to provide a reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language.63 The
Chevron court recognized the broad regulatory authority that Congress delegated to administrative agencies and acknowledged that
courts should accord deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes, particularly because administrative agencies are entrusted by Congress to administer them.64
C. Limitations on the Deference Accorded to Administrative
Agencies
Despite Chevron’s broad deferential standard, however, administrative agencies are not accorded unlimited discretion in administering statutes and interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions.65
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,66 the Supreme Court of the
United States considered “whether it was permissible for [the] EPA
to determine that its motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the [CAA] for
stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.”67
62. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnote omitted) (providing test Court relies
on to review agencies’ statutory construction and interpretation).
63. See id. at 843-44 (discussing agency’s implicit authority to resolve statutory
ambiguities).
64. See id. at 844 (recognizing “principle of deference” that must be accorded
to agency interpretations of statutory schemes).
65. For a discussion of the limited discretion provided to agencies, see supra
notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
66. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
67. See id. at 2434 (discussing central challenge to EPA’s standards). In issuing these standards, the EPA cited its findings that “greenhouse-gas emissions from
new motor vehicles contribute to elevated atmospheric concentrations of green-
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The CAA’s act-wide definition of “air pollutant” included
greenhouse gases and the CAA “authorize[d] [the] EPA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions” emitted by motor vehicles.68 The EPA
interpreted the CAA’s act-wide definition of “air pollutant” to encompass not only greenhouse gases emitted by motor vehicles but
also greenhouse gases emitted by stationary sources, and accordingly determined that the Agency is compelled to regulate stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases since, under the CAA, “air
pollutants” automatically triggered the relevant regulations.69 The
Court evaluated the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA using the deferential standard established under Chevron.70 The Court ultimately ruled that the Agency improperly extended the act-wide
definition of “air pollutant” to greenhouse gases emitted by stationary sources because it misapplied the term within the “overall statutory scheme.”71 The Court, therefore, held that the applicability of
permitting requirements to motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions does not implicitly validate the applicability of such permitting requirements to stationary source greenhouse gas emissions.72
According to the Court, the EPA’s statutory interpretation of the
CAA was “impermissible” because the Agency had essentially tailored the legislation to its own “bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.”73 In reaching its decision, the
Court emphasized that “[e]ven under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation.”74
The Court further delineated a limitation on administrative
agencies’ authority to reasonably interpret ambiguous statutory prohouse gases, which endanger public health and welfare by fostering global ‘climate
change’.” Id. at 2437 (citation omitted).
68. See id. at 2436-40 (citation omitted) (explaining CAA provisions triggering
greenhouse gas regulations). “In 2007, the Court held that Title II of the [CAA]
‘authorize[d] EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles’
if the Agency ‘form[ed] a ‘judgment’ that such emissions contribute to climate
change.’” Id. at 2436 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007)).
69. See id. at 2439-40 (discussing EPA’s interpretation of CAA’s act-wide definition of “air pollutant”).
70. See id. at 2439 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43) (providing Court’s standard of review under Chevron).
71. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2439-42 (citation omitted) (providing explanation of regulation triggers).
72. See id. at 2442 (stating Court’s overall finding with respect to regulation
triggers).
73. See id. at 2445 (rejecting EPA’s interpretation of statute’s triggering
provisions).
74. See id. at 2442 (citing Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (providing case law in support of Court’s holding).
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visions by providing that an express statutory authority to consider
cost is required in order for an agency to consider cost in setting
regulations.75 In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,76 the Supreme Court of the United States evaluated whether the EPA Administrator “may consider the costs of implementation in setting
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under [Section]
109” of the CAA.77 The relevant provision of the CAA directed the
EPA to “set primary ambient air quality standards . . . ‘requisite to
protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety’.”78
The EPA interpreted this provision of the CAA to mean that the
Agency may consider implementation costs in setting NAAQS.79
The Court, however, refused to find an “implicit . . . authorization
to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly
granted.”80 Essentially, the Court held that there must be a clear
“textual commitment of authority” that allows “the EPA to consider
costs in setting NAAQS” standards.81 Absent some “clear” or explicit statutory authority, the EPA is precluded from considering
costs in enacting regulations.82
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Michigan, the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision
focused solely on whether it was reasonable for the EPA to ignore
costs when concluding that the regulation of power plants was “appropriate and necessary.”83 The Court’s analysis began by discuss75. For a discussion of this limitation, see infra notes 76-82 and accompanying
text.
76. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
77. See id. at 462 (stating issues on appeal).
78. Id. at 465 (citation omitted) (quoting language of Section 109(b)(1) of
CAA that provides NAAQS regulatory guidelines).
79. See id. at 463 (discussing EPA’s interpretation of CAA provision).
80. See id. at 467 (citations omitted) (providing Court’s conclusion with respect to EPA’s statutory interpretation of CAA provision).
81. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (quoting Court’s conclusion regarding
proper statutory interpretation of CAA provision).
82. See id. (emphasizing importance of “clear” textual authority to consider
cost).
83. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (providing overall issue before Supreme Court of United States).
Although the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed a number of claims
relating to the EPA’s final rule, the only issue on appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States was the reasonableness of the EPA’s decision to regulate power
plants. See White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1234-58 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
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ing relevant case law.84 The Court noted that Chevron provides the
applicable standard of review of the EPA’s interpretation of the
CAA.85 Next, the Court presented the underlying rationale of its
ruling that the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA was unreasonable.86
Finally, the Court discussed the arguments offered by the EPA to
justify its interpretation of the CAA and refuted each argument in
turn before announcing its decision.87
A. Majority’s Ruling that the EPA Unreasonably Ignored Cost
As an initial matter, the Court reiterated the reasoning behind
the EPA’s decision not to consider cost in determining whether the
regulation of power plants was “appropriate and necessary”.88 The
EPA’s refusal to consider cost rested on its interpretation of Section
7412 of the CAA.89 Section 7412 of the CAA “directs the Agency to
regulate power plants if it finds such regulation is appropriate and
necessary.”90 The Court emphasized that although the Agency
“could have interpreted this provision to mean that cost is relevant
to the decision to [regulate] power plants[,] . . . it chose to read the
statute to mean that cost makes no difference to the initial decision
to regulate.”91 The Court found that the EPA, by choosing to interpret Section 7412 of the CAA to mean that cost is irrelevant to the
initial decision to regulate, “strayed far beyond” the “bounds of reasonable interpretation.”92
The Court regarded the EPA’s refusal to consider cost as an
excessive and unreasonable use of its administrative discretion.93
84. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (reviewing applicable case law). Part II
of the opinion encompasses this section. Id.
85. See id. (announcing standard of review under Chevron). For a discussion
of the Chevron deference standard, see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
86. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (discussing rationale that led to Court’s
decision). Part II(A) of the opinion encompasses this section. Id.
87. See id. at 2708-10 (discussing and rejecting EPA’s arguments put forth to
justify its refusal to consider cost). Part II(B) of the opinion encompasses this
section. Id.
88. See id. at 2706-07 (reinforcing basis of EPA’s decision).
89. Id. at 2706 (reciting Agency’s statutory authority). Specifically, the EPA
relied upon Section 7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA. Id.
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing CAA’s directive to EPA
for regulating power plants).
91. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (noting Agency’s equal opportunity to interpret statute to encompass cost as relevant
factor).
92. Id. at 2707 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442
(2014)) (finding EPA’s decision unwarranted).
93. For a discussion of the Court’s reasoning of why it found the EPA’s decision excessive and unreasonable, see infra notes 83-137 and accompanying text.
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The Court provided three reasons to justify its finding of administrative abuse of discretion.94 First, “[r]ead naturally . . . the phrase
‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at least some attention to
cost.”95 The Court presumed that “[o]ne would not say that it is
even rational, never mind ‘appropriate[ ]’[,] to impose billions of
dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or
environmental benefits.”96 The Court criticized the EPA’s interpretation because it effectively allows the Agency to disregard any type
of cost, including health or environmental costs.97 Thus, under the
EPA’s interpretation, a regulation whose incidental health or environmental costs exceed its benefits would nevertheless be deemed
appropriate.98 The Court, however, reasoned that “[n]o regulation
is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good.”99
Second, agencies have traditionally “treated cost as a centrally
relevant factor when deciding whether to regulate.”100 According
to the Court, “[agencies’] [c]onsideration of cost reflects the understanding that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying
attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions.”101 The Court thus found that “[a]gainst the backdrop of
this established administrative practice, it is unreasonable to read
an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether
‘regulation is appropriate and necessary’ as an invitation to ignore
cost.”102 By interpreting the “appropriate and necessary” provision
to mean that cost is irrelevant to regulation, the EPA conveniently
94. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct at 2707-08 (discussing unreasonableness of
Agency’s interpretation of CAA).
95. Id. at 2707 (explaining that natural reading of “appropriate and necessary” standard necessarily imports attention to cost).
96. Id. (explaining irrationality of EPA’s interpretation of “appropriate and
necessary” standard based on common sense).
97. Id. (providing further criticism of EPA’s interpretation). The Court noted
that “cost includes more than the expense of complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed a cost.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. (demonstrating unreasonableness of EPA’s interpretation by applying
Agency’s underlying rationale to different type of cost). “The Government concede[d] [in oral argument] that if the Agency were to find that emissions from
power plants do damage to human health, but that the technologies needed to
eliminate these emissions do even more damage to human health, it would still
deem regulation appropriate.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
99. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (highlighting irrationality of deeming regulation whose social harm significantly outweighs social good as “appropriate”).
100. Id. (citing traditional administrative practice of considering cost as relevant factor in regulation).
101. Id. (emphasis omitted) (explaining relevance of cost to regulation).
102. Id. at 2708 (finding EPA’s interpretation of “appropriate and necessary”
provision as statutory “invitation to ignore cost” unreasonable).
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regarded the CAA’s directive as an “invitation to ignore cost” in
contravention to established administrative practice.103
Third, “[s]tatutory context reinforces the relevance of cost.”104
Under Section 7412(n)(1) of the CAA, subparagraph (A) requires
the “EPA to [conduct a] study [of] the hazards to public health
posed by power plants and to determine whether regulation is appropriate and necessary.”105 Meanwhile, subparagraphs (B) and
(C) require the EPA to conduct two additional studies, one of
which requires a study of mercury emissions from power plants with
specific considerations of the “health and environmental effects of
such emissions, technologies which are available to control such
emissions, and the costs of such technologies.”106 The Court established that although subparagraph (A) provides the “appropriate
and necessary” standard with no explicit mention of cost, subparagraphs (B) and (C) explicitly mention cost and, thereby, implicitly
extend the relevance of cost to the regulation of power plants
under subparagraph (A).107 The statutory context of the “appropriate and necessary” provision further indicates, accordingly, that
Congress intended cost to be a relevant consideration in the decision to regulate power plants.108
The Court noted that the EPA, in an attempt to “minimize this
express reference to cost,” argued that Section 7412(n)(1)(A) of
the CAA “requires it to consider only the study mandated by that
provision, [and] not the separate mercury study, before deciding
whether to regulate power plants.”109 Yet, in adopting its final rule,
the EPA “insisted that the provisions concerning all three studies
provide[d] a framework for [its] determination of whether to regulate [power plants].”110 In doing so, the EPA effectively conceded
103. See id. (criticizing Agency’s decision as nonconforming to administrative
practice).
104. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708 (providing third reason underlying Court’s
finding of EPA’s statutory interpretation as unreasonable).
105. Id. (citing section of CAA requiring EPA’s study of power plants).
106. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Section 7412(n)(1)(B) of CAA requiring
EPA’s study of health and environmental effects of mercury emissions).
107. See id. (indicating how express mention of cost in related subparagraphs
establishes implicit relevance of cost to subparagraph providing “appropriate and
necessary” standard).
108. See id. (explaining how statutory directive to consider cost in other related studies further indicates relevance of cost to regulation).
109. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708 (discussing EPA’s argument concerning statute’s express mention of cost).
110. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 76 Fed. Reg. 24976, 24987 (May 3, 2011) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63)) (referencing three studies as framework for
Agency’s determination regarding whether to regulate power plants).
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that it interpreted the “scope of the appropriate and necessary finding in the context of all three studies.”111 The Court undermined
this argument by highlighting the Agency’s failure to explain how
subparagraph (B)’s express mention of “environmental effects . . .
and . . . costs” provided “direct evidence” of Congress’s concern
with environmental effects rather than with costs.112 The Court
stressed that “Chevron allows agencies to choose among competing
reasonable interpretations of a statute; it does not license interpretive gerrymanders under which an agency keeps parts of statutory
context it likes while throwing away parts it does not.”113 In the
Court’s view, the EPA’s interpretation of the “appropriate and necessary” provision as not encompassing cost amounted to a selective
statutory interpretation serving administrative convenience rather
than a reasonable statutory interpretation.114
B. Refuting the EPA’s Interpretation of the “Appropriate and
Necessary” Clause
The EPA provided several reasons to justify its interpretation of
Section 7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA, which establishes the “appropriate and necessary” standard, to mean that cost is irrelevant to the
initial decision to regulate power plants, all of which the Supreme
Court of the United States refuted, finding them entirely unpersuasive.115 First, the EPA argued that “other parts of the Clean Air Act
expressly mention cost” while Section 7412(n)(1)(A) does not.116
The Court rebutted this argument by indicating that it is “unreasonable to infer that, by expressly making cost relevant to other decisions, the [CAA] implicitly makes cost irrelevant to the
appropriateness of regulating power plants.”117 To analogize the
flaw in the Agency’s logic, the Court compared it to the fact that
while other sections of the CAA expressly mention “environmental
111. Id. (emphasis omitted) (affirming three studies as underlying basis of
Agency’s “appropriate and necessary” finding).
112. Id. (emphasizing inconsistencies in Agency’s argument).
113. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984)) (criticizing Agency’s interpretation of statutory context as administrative convenience rather than “reasonable interpretation[ ]” of statute). For a
discussion of Chevron, see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
114. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708 (distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible agencies’ interpretations of statutes under Chevron).
115. See id. (providing EPA’s arguments to justify its interpretation of Section
7412(n)(1)(A) as disregarding cost). The Court discussed these arguments and
countered them in Part B of the opinion. See id. at 2708-10.
116. Id. at 2708-09 (discussing first argument EPA made to justify its statutory
interpretation).
117. Id. at 2709 (rebutting first argument EPA made finding it unreasonable).
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effects,” Section 7412(n)(1)(A) does not and, yet, “that did not stop
EPA from deeming environmental effects relevant to the appropriateness of regulating power plants.”118
Second, the EPA sought support from the decision reached by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Whitman.119 Whitman
established the principle that “where the Clean Air Act expressly
directs EPA to regulate on the basis of a factor that on its face does
not include cost, the Act normally should not be read as implicitly
allowing the Agency to consider cost anyway.”120 The Court, however, rejected the applicability of Whitman to this case, reasoning
that the “appropriate and necessary” standard established under
Michigan is a “far more comprehensive criterion” than the “requisite to protect the public health” standard established under Whitman.121 According to the Court, the term “appropriate and
necessary . . . read fairly and in context . . . plainly subsumes consideration of cost.”122
Third, the EPA argued that “it need not consider cost when
first deciding whether to regulate power plants because it can consider cost later when deciding how much to regulate them.”123 The
Court refuted this argument by emphasizing that the question
before it was the meaning of the “appropriate and necessary standard that governs the initial decision to regulate” and not its implication on subsequent regulation.124 The Court reasoned that
“[c]ost may become relevant again at a later stage of the regulatory
process, but that possibility does not establish its irrelevance at this
stage.”125 Again, the Court reiterated that the statutory context of
118. Id. (analogizing EPA’s flawed logic by comparing relevance of other statutory provisions not expressly mentioned but relied upon in EPA’s “appropriate
and necessary” finding).
119. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2709 (discussing second argument EPA offered
to justify its statutory interpretation). For a discussion of Whitman, see supra notes
76-82 and accompanying text.
120. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2709 (providing precedent set in Whitman).
121. See id. (finding standard set in Whitman inapplicable). Whitman’s standard was broadly defined, while Michigan’s “appropriate and necessary” standard
was narrowly defined to implicitly include cost as relevant factor. Id.
122. Id. (establishing statutory context of “appropriate and necessary” standard “plainly” includes cost as relevant factor).
123. Id. (emphasis in original) (discussing third argument EPA made to justify its statutory interpretation).
124. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (restating central issue before
Court to rebut EPA’s third argument).
125. Michigan, 135 S. Ct at 2709 (emphasis omitted) (explaining that cost’s
relevance to later regulatory stages does not eliminate its relevance to initial regulatory stages).
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the “appropriate and necessary” standard reinforces its expansive
nature to logically encompass cost.126
Fourth, the EPA argued that the “Clean Air Act makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate sources other than power
plants.”127 The Agency, therefore, claimed that “it is reasonable to
interpret [Section] 7412(n)(1)(A) in a way that harmonizes the
program’s treatment of power plants with its treatment of other
sources.”128 The Court rejected this argument, holding that this
“line of reasoning overlooks the whole point of having a separate
provision about power plants: treating power plants differently from
other stationary sources.”129 According to the Court, Congress
drafted a separate provision for the regulation of power plants precisely to emphasize its intent to treat power plants differently by
subjecting them to an expansive standard of regulation that encompasses multiple factors.130
Lastly, the EPA argued that “Congress treated power plants differently from other sources because of uncertainty about whether
regulation of power plants would still be needed after the application of the rest of the Act’s requirements.”131 The Court acknowledged that this is “undoubtedly one of the reasons Congress treated
power plants differently[.]”132 The Court noted, however, that “if
uncertainty about the need for regulation were the only reason to
treat power plants differently, Congress would have required the
Agency to decide only whether regulation remains necessary, not
whether regulation is appropriate and necessary.”133 Moreover, the
Court cited to the EPA’s assertion that it made the “appropriate
and necessary” finding in light of all three studies required under
Section 7412(n)(1)(A), one of which expressly reflected a consider126. See id. (emphasizing significance of “appropriate and necessary” standard’s statutory context in order to buttress importance of considerations of cost).
127. Id. at 2709-10 (discussing fourth argument EPA makes to justify its statutory interpretation).
128. Id. at 2710 (internal quotation marks omitted) (clarifying EPA’s
argument).
129. Id. (emphasis in original) (rejecting EPA’s argument by emphasizing significance of separate statutory provision for regulation of power plants).
130. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2710 (discussing congressional intent behind separate statutory provision for regulation of power plants).
131. Id. (discussing final argument EPA made to justify its statutory
interpretation).
132. Id. (agreeing partially with EPA’s reasoning underlying Congress’s separate statutory provision for power plant regulation).
133. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (rebutting
EPA’s explanation for separate statutory provision establishing standard for regulation of power plants).
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ation of cost, to bolster the meaning of the “appropriate and necessary” standard.134
Based upon its analysis and reasoning, the Supreme Court of
the United States found the EPA’s interpretation of the “appropriate and necessary” standard established under Section
7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA to be unreasonable.135 The Court held
that the EPA “interpreted [Section] 7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably
when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision to regulate power
plants.”136 The Court, therefore, ruled that the Agency “must consider cost-including, most importantly, cost of compliance-before
deciding whether regulation [of power plants] is appropriate and
necessary.”137
Justice Thomas agreed with the result reached by the Court,
but wrote a separate concurring opinion.138 Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion focused on the potentially unconstitutional deference afforded to agencies under Chevron.139 According to Justice
Thomas, the Chevron deference granted to agencies in interpreting
federal statutes raises serious constitutional questions and, thus,
warrants greater judicial scrutiny.140
C. Dissent’s Finding that the EPA Reasonably Accounted for
Cost
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer and
Justice Sotomayor, dissented.141 The dissent concluded that the
“EPA, in regulating power plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants, accounted for costs in a reasonable way.”142 The dissent
reached its conclusion by explaining that simply declining to con134. See id. (citing EPA’s admitted significance of all three studies required
under Section 7412(n)(1) to its “appropriate and necessary” inquiry).
135. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711-12 (discussing Court’s holding). For a
discussion of the Court’s analysis and reasoning, see supra notes 83-134 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 2712 (announcing holding of Supreme Court of United States).
137. Id. at 2711 (explaining that cost of compliance must be considered in
deciding whether to regulate power plants).
138. See id. at 2712-14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (warning of potential constitutional danger in granting administrative agencies excessive deference under
Chevron).
139. See id. at 2712-13 (explaining basis of perceived constitutional danger).
For a discussion of Chevron, see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
140. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712-14 (discussing constitutional danger and
suggesting need for greater scrutiny of agencies’ statutory interpretations).
141. See id. at 2714-26 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (providing dissenting opinion).
142. Id. at 2718 (stating dissent’s overall conclusion that EPA reasonably accounted for costs in reaching its ultimate decision to regulate power plants).
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sider cost at the initial stages of regulation does not mean that the
“Agency gave cost no thought at all[,]” as the majority asserted.143
The dissent refuted the majority’s finding by explaining that the
Agency “did not explicitly analyze costs at the very first stage of the
regulatory process” precisely because it recognized that later stages
of the regulatory process would necessarily ensure the “cost-effectiveness” of the regulation.144
The dissent further pointed out that the “EPA could not have
accurately assessed costs” at the initial stages of the regulatory process.145 Indeed, the regulatory process requires the “appropriate
and necessary” finding to precede the Agency’s determination of
emissions standards, “[a]nd until [the] EPA knows what standards
it will establish, it cannot know what costs they will impose.”146
Moreover, the dissent emphasized the Agency’s authority to decline
to consider cost at the initial stage of the regulatory process.147 Applying the Chevron deference standard, the dissent reiterated that
“when Congress does not say how to take costs into account, agencies have broad discretion to make that judgment.”148 The Court
must, therefore, defer to the Agency’s reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguity in the CAA, according to the dissent’s opinion.149
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Court in Michigan held that the EPA unreasonably interpreted the “appropriate and necessary” clause in determining
whether to regulate power plants and based its finding on both statutory analysis and relevant case law.150 Section A discusses the
Court’s disagreement on which stage of the regulatory process cost
143. See id. at 2714-15 (emphasis omitted) (explaining that alternative analysis
refutes majority’s conclusion that EPA failed to consider cost entirely).
144. See id. at 2714 (discussing why dissent found EPA’s decision not to consider cost at initial stages of regulation reasonable).
145. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2723 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (highlighting why
costs could not have been accurately determined during early stages of
regulation).
146. See id. (noting order of regulatory stages inhibits EPA from providing
accurate cost estimates).
147. See id. at 2714-15 (discussing dissent’s rationale).
148. See id. at 2726 (explaining Chevron’s deferential framework requires Court
to defer to Agency’s reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguity).
149. Id. (reiterating importance of judicial deference to Congressional grant
of legislative authority to agencies).
150. For a discussion of the Court’s analysis and findings, see supra notes 83137 and accompanying text.
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becomes a relevant factor.151 Section B discusses the Court’s disagreement on the extent of deference that should be accorded to
the Agency’s interpretation of the statutory ambiguity.152 Section C
discusses the Court’s adherence to the principle of deference in
light of existing case law.153 Lastly, section D addresses the Constitutional danger of according broad deference to administrative
agencies’ statutory interpretations.154
A. Stage of the Regulatory Process in Which Cost Becomes a
Relevant Factor
The central question before the Supreme Court of the United
States in Michigan was whether the EPA reasonably interpreted the
“appropriate and necessary” clause in determining whether to regulate power plants.155 The majority held that the EPA unreasonably
interpreted the statute’s “appropriate and necessary” provision to
mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power
plants.156 In reaching its ruling, the majority considered (1) administrative agencies’ traditional practice of treating “cost as a centrally
relevant factor when deciding whether to regulate[,]” (2) a natural
and logical reading of the “appropriate and necessary” clause, and
(3) statutory context, which, together, “reinforc[e] the relevance of
cost” to the decision to regulate.157 Conversely, the dissent held
that the EPA reasonably interpreted the statute’s “appropriate and
necessary” provision to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power plants.158 To support its conclusion, the
dissent emphasized that the EPA’s “appropriate and necessary”
151. For a discussion of the Court’s disagreement on this point, see infra
notes 155-173 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the Court’s disagreement on this point, see infra
notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the Court’s adherence to the principle of deference,
see infra notes 179-188 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the Constitutional danger of according agencies
broad deference, see infra notes 189-197 and accompanying text.
155. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2704 (stating case’s central issue). The “appropriate and necessary” provision is found in Section 7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA,
which directs the EPA to regulate power plants if it finds regulation “appropriate
and necessary.” Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (1970) (amended 1977
and 1990).
156. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (providing majority’s holding).
157. See id. at 2707-09 (discussing rationale behind majority’s holding). For a
complete discussion of the Court’s analysis and reasoning, see supra notes 83-149
and accompanying text.
158. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2715 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (providing dissent’s conclusion that EPA reasonably declined to consider cost at initial stage of
regulation).
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finding represents only the first stage in the regulatory process and
that later stages of the regulatory process will necessarily ensure the
“cost-effectiveness” of the regulation.159 The central disagreement
between the majority and dissent, therefore, rests on determining
which stage of the regulatory process must cost constitute a relevant
consideration in the regulation of power plants.160
The regulatory stage at which cost becomes a relevant consideration is, however, a distinction without a difference.161 Cost undoubtedly represents an important factor in regulation generally.162
Cost, however, should not always trump all other considerations,
especially when human health and environmental protection are at
stake.163 The majority found that the “Agency gave cost no thought
at all” in making its initial “appropriate and necessary” finding.164
Contrary to the majority’s finding that the EPA failed to consider
costs altogether, the EPA reasonably accounted for costs because, as
the dissent points out, the Agency’s initial “appropriate and necessary” finding was predicated on its knowledge and experience that
later regulatory stages would inevitably ensure the “cost-effectiveness” of the regulation.165
Indeed, the EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis provided that
when the regulation’s “ancillary benefits” are taken into account,
the estimated “quantifiable benefits” of the regulation increase
from thirty-seven to ninety billion dollars annually.166 While the
EPA acknowledged that the regulation’s “ancillary benefits . . .
played no role in its appropriate-and-necessary finding[,]” these
“ancillary benefits” nevertheless provide a strong indication of the
159. See id. at 2714-15 (explaining EPA’s decision not to consider cost in initial stage of regulation proper given that cost will be considered in virtually all
subsequent stages of regulation).
160. For a discussion of the majority and dissent’s central points of disagreement, see supra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of why the regulatory stage at which cost becomes relevant is a distinction without a difference, see infra notes 162-173 and accompanying text.
162. See generally Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (discussing significance of
cost to regulation).
163. See id. at 2726 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (suggesting majority’s decision deprives EPA of using its regulatory authority to “save many, many lives”).
164. See id. at 2706 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original) (finding Agency
completely disregarded cost because it “considered cost irrelevant to its initial decision to regulate”).
165. See id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (finding EPA’s deferral of considering cost during initial regulatory stage reasonable because later regulatory stages
would necessarily encompass considerations of cost).
166. See id. at 2705-06 (majority opinion) (discussing estimated impact of regulation’s “ancillary benefits” provided in EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis).
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potential “cost-effectiveness” of the regulation.167 Although the
regulation’s initial costs substantially outweigh its quantifiable benefits, the regulation’s long-term benefits may substantially outweigh
its costs by an even greater margin.168 The Regulatory Impact Analysis estimates that the regulation’s initial cost of compliance to
power plants is 9.6 billion dollars annually while the quantifiable
benefits of reduced emissions are four to six million annually.169
Taking the regulation’s ancillary benefits into account, however,
substantially increases the regulation’s estimated quantifiable benefits ranging from thirty-seven to ninety billion dollars annually.170
The Court’s disagreement as to which regulatory stage determines
the relevance of cost is, therefore, overshadowed by the potential
economic significance of the regulation as a whole.171 Instead of
evaluating the EPA’s decision in light of the potential benefits of
implementing the regulation, the Court appeared highly dismissive
of the Agency’s Regulatory Impact Analysis altogether, finding that
the “Agency gave cost no thought at all.”172 This is simply not the
case, however, because the Agency’s Regulatory Impact Analysis indeed considered the long-run costs and provided significant evidence that the regulation’s ancillary benefits substantially outweigh
the regulation’s initial costs.173
B. Extent of Deference Accorded to Administrative Agencies
The Court’s disagreement additionally rests on the extent of
deference that should be afforded to the EPA and administrative
agencies generally under Chevron.174 The majority found that the
EPA “strayed far beyond” the “bounds of reasonable interpretation”
when it declined to consider cost in deciding whether to regulate
167. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (discussing impact of regulation’s “ancillary benefits”).
168. See id. at 2705-06 (explaining regulation’s monetary impact).
169. See id. at 2705-06 (discussing estimated annual costs and benefits of
EPA’s regulation).
170. See id. (discussing estimated ancillary benefits of implementing EPA’s
regulation). Ancillary benefits include “cutting power plants’ emissions of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide[,]” which are “substances that are not covered by
the hazardous-air-pollutants program.” Id. at 2706.
171. For a discussion of the economic significance of the regulation as a
whole, see supra note 166-170 and accompanying text.
172. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (emphasis omitted) (concluding that
EPA failed to consider cost entirely in reaching its initial decision to regulate).
173. For a discussion of the findings of the Regulatory Impact Analysis, see
supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of Chevron deference, see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
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power plants.175 The dissent, on the other hand, found that Congress grants the EPA broad authority and that the EPA “exercised
that authority reasonably and responsibly” when it declined to consider cost in the initial stage of the regulatory process.176 The majority defines the scope of the Agency’s discretion conservatively,
whereas, the dissent defines the scope of the Agency’s discretion
liberally.177 Nevertheless, the dissent’s liberal interpretation of
agency discretion is more in accordance with how the Court has
traditionally evaluated issues of statutory ambiguity.178
C. Adhering to the Principle of Deference
The Court’s decision in Michigan appears internally inconsistent with its prior decisions.179 The Court, in Chevron, established
the principle of deference to administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations.180 Based on this principle of deference, the Court
has been reluctant to strike down an agency’s interpretation of a
statutory ambiguity.181 In Michigan, however, the Court strayed
from its long-standing principle of deference by finding the EPA’s
interpretation of the CAA unreasonable despite the EPA’s judgment that regulation is “appropriate and necessary” based on its
specialized knowledge and experience.182
Rather than accord the EPA deference in its finding that the
regulation of power plants is “appropriate and necessary,” the
Court engaged in a close scrutiny of the Agency’s underlying rationale.183 While the Court stresses that the Agency gave cost “no
175. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2443 (2014)) (finding EPA exceeded its interpretive authority).
176. See id. at 2726 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing EPA acted “reasonably
and responsibly” within its interpretive authority in regulating power plants).
177. For a discussion of the Court’s disagreement with respect to the EPA’s
authority, see supra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of the Court’s deference to administrative agencies, see
supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of how this decision is internally inconsistent, see infra
notes 179-188 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of Chevron, see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
181. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (establishing principle of judicial deference to administrative
agencies’ interpretations and constructions of statutes); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at
2706-07 (reviewing EPA’s “necessary and appropriate” regulation of power plants
under Chevron deference standard); Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)
(applying Chevron deference standard in reviewing FCC ruling under Telecommunications Act).
182. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711-12 (holding EPA’s interpretation
unreasonable).
183. See id. at 2706-12 (discussing Court’s analysis and rejecting all of EPA’s
arguments).
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thought at all” in its initial decision to regulate, the EPA explained
that its decision not to consider cost “when first deciding whether
to regulate” was predicated on the fact that cost will inevitably become relevant “when deciding how much to regulate.”184 As the
dissent points out, “[c]osts matter in regulation. But when Congress
does not say how to take costs into account, agencies have broad
discretion to make that judgment.”185 The Agency’s judgment and
its ultimate decision to decline considerations of cost in the initial
stage of the regulatory process should have been granted deference
by the Court.186 The statutory provision that authorizes the EPA to
regulate stationary sources, including power plants, does not explicitly state during which stage of the regulatory process cost must be
considered or that cost should be a consideration in regulating
power plants at all.187 Without a clear or explicit Congressional directive to consider cost, the Agency exercised its discretion and interpreted the statutory ambiguity by deferring considerations of
cost to later stages of the regulatory process, and that interpretation
should have been accorded deference by the Court.188
D. The Constitutional Danger of According Administrative
Agencies Broad Deference
The concurring opinion focused entirely on the constitutional
ramifications of Chevron.189 Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion
warns of the “potentially unconstitutional delegations” of authority
granted under the Chevron deference standard and urges for
greater judicial scrutiny of agency “interpretations” of federal stat184. See id. at 2706-09 (explaining discrepancy between Court’s rationale and
EPA’s argument).
185. See id. at 2726 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that Congress grants
agencies broad powers and judiciary should honor that by granting agencies
deference).
186. See id. at 2726 (providing importance of granting agencies broad discretion to make regulatory judgments).
187. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (providing “appropriate
and necessary” standard without mention of cost considerations).
188. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2717 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining reasonableness of Agency’s determination). The dissent emphasized that “the
Agency, when making its ‘appropriate and necessary’ finding, did not decline to
consider costs as part of the regulatory process. Rather, it declined to consider
costs at a single stage of that process, knowing that they would come in later on.”
Id.
189. See id. at 2712-14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (providing concurring opinion). For a discussion of Chevron deference, see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying notes.
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utes.190 According to Justice Thomas, “agencies interpreting ambiguous statutes [ ] are not engaged in acts of interpretation at all”
but rather in the “formulation of policy.”191 He explains that
“[S]tatutory ambiguity thus becomes an implicit delegation of rulemaking authority” which is then used to “fill in gaps based on policy
judgments[.]”192
The observation that agencies are engaging in the “formulation of policy” illuminates the impact that agency decisions and regulations make on policymaking.193 That observation, however,
equally supports both the majority’s opinion and the dissent’s opinion.194 The majority can thus argue that by striking the Agency’s
regulation for not initially considering cost, it is discouraging
agency decisions that fail to properly consider cost and, thereby,
encouraging more cost-effective regulations.195 The dissent can
likewise argue that by favoring the Agency’s regulation despite its
initial reluctance to consider cost, it is encouraging agency decisions that succeed to holistically consider cost, and, thereby, discourage more cost-centric regulations.196 Either way, Justice
Thomas’s concurrence provides no additional guidance for administrative agencies in implementing future regulations.197
VI. IMPACT
The Court’s decision in Michigan is likely to have a meaningful
impact on the EPA’s regulatory power.198 The Court’s ruling that
the Agency “must consider cost,” including the “cost of compliance,” when deciding whether regulation is “appropriate and neces190. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713-14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (explaining constitutional danger of Chevron
deference).
191. Id. at 2712-13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing effect of
agencies’ interpretive authority on policy making).
192. Id. at 2713 (explaining powerful effect of agency authority on policy
making).
193. For a discussion of how agencies are engaged in the “formulation of policy,” see supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of how the concurring opinion equally supports both
the majority’s holding and the dissent’s conclusion, see infra notes 195-197 and
accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of the majority opinion and reasoning, see supra notes
83-137 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion and reasoning, see supra notes
141-149 and accompanying text.
197. For a further discussion of the concurring opinion, see supra notes 138140 and accompanying text.
198. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Court’s decision intrudes on agencies’ regulatory power and broad discretion).
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sary” under the CAA effectively imposes a restraint upon the EPA’s
regulatory power.199 The Michigan Court suggests that the EPA will
not be capable of making its regulatory decisions based upon its
comprehensive analysis and judgment without giving the costs associated with its regulatory decisions any consideration.200 Instead,
the EPA must consider the cost-effectiveness of a regulation, even at
the initial stages of the regulatory process, before passing a
regulation.201
Beyond the EPA, this decision suggests that agencies must generally make cost-effective decisions when exercising their regulatory
power.202 This decision’s applicability may affect other federal
agencies, particularly because this is a binding Supreme Court of
the United States precedent applicable to all federal agencies.203
Furthermore, the decision is advantageous to industries and entities
subject to agency regulations because it affords them the assurance
that agency regulations must be cost-effective at the outset to be
upheld as reasonable.204
Despite the fact that agencies have traditionally been granted
deference, the Supreme Court of the United States in Michigan undoubtedly diminished the extent of deference granted to administrative agencies.205 Rather than defer to the specialized knowledge
and experience of agencies in their respective regulatory field, the
Court retracted agencies’ regulatory power.206 The Court essentially reminded the EPA that regulatory decisions cannot be based
on entirely ideal environmental goals, but rather, they must be
practical and economically justified.207 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court of the United States upholds the broad deference granted to
administrative agencies, but limits the extent of its deference to rea199. See id. at 2711 (majority opinion) (holding EPA must consider cost in
regulating power plants).
200. See id. at 2726 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining majority’s decision denies agencies power to use its broad discretion).
201. For a further discussion of the Court’s analysis and rationale, see supra
notes 83-137 and accompanying text.
202. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (providing Court’s rationale that cost
must be considered in deciding whether to regulate power plants).
203. See generally id. at 2712 (providing Supreme Court of United States found
that cost must be considered in determining whether to regulate).
204. For a further discussion of the Court’s analysis and rationale, see supra
notes 83-137 and accompanying text.
205. For a further discussion of the principle of deference, see supra notes 5364 and accompanying text.
206. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining disappointment with majority’s lack of deference to agency expertise and judgment).
207. For a further discussion of the Court’s analysis and holding, see supra
notes 83-137 and accompanying text.
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sonable regulations that necessarily embrace considerations of
cost.208
Ruby Khallouf*
208. For a further discussion of the Court’s analysis and holding, see supra
notes 83-137 and accompanying text.
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